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Abstract
We explore conclusions a person draws from observing society when he allows for the pos-
sibility that individuals’ outcomes are affected by group-level discrimination. Injecting a single
non-classical assumption, that the agent is overconfident about himself, we explain key observed
patterns in social beliefs, and make a number of additional predictions. First, the agent believes
in discrimination against any group he is in more than an outsider does, capturing widely ob-
served self-centered views of discrimination. Second, the more group memberships the agent
shares with an individual, the more positively he evaluates the individual. This explains one
of the most basic facts about social judgments, in-group bias, as well as “legitimizing myths”
that justify an arbitrary social hierarchy through the perceived superiority of the privileged
group. Third, biases are sensitive to how the agent divides society into groups when evaluating
outcomes. This provides a reason why some ethnically charged questions should not be asked,
as well as a potential channel for why nation-building policies might be effective. Fourth, giving
the agent more accurate information about himself increases all his biases. Fifth, the agent is
prone to substitute biases, implying that the introduction of a new outsider group to focus on
creates biases against the new group but lowers biases vis a vis other groups. Sixth, there is a
tendency for the agent to agree more with those in the same groups. As a microfoundation for
our model, we provide an explanation for why an overconfident agent might allow for potential
discrimination in evaluating outcomes, even when he initially did not conceive of this possibility.
∗We are grateful to Aislinn Bohren, Alex Imas, Robert Lieli, and Florian Zimmermann for insightful discussions,
and seminar and conference audiences for comments.
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1 Introduction
Among the many factors that hinder the fair and productive coexistence of different social groups,
two sets of widely held beliefs surely stand out. First, many or most people think of their own group
as superior to other groups, and often hold negative evaluations of other groups. For instance, the
majority of non-Muslim Americans believe that Muslims do not want to adopt the American way
of life, a statement that most Muslims disagree with. Second, different groups hold dissenting views
about the most urgent intergroup problems. For instance, blacks consider discrimination against
blacks a greater problem than whites do — who often believe that discrimination against whites
is going on. Such beliefs can in turn foster or maintain interpersonal discrimination and conflict
between groups, especially when resources are scarce (Jackson, 2011, Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).
In this paper, we develop a novel theory of prejudiced beliefs based on a person’s attempts to
understand society while maintaining stubborn, unrealistically positive views of himself. Looking
to best explain why his outcomes are not as good as he thinks he deserves, the agent comes to
overestimate discrimination against any social group he is a member of, and to overestimate dis-
crimination in favor of any group he is a competitor of. Furthermore, interpreting others’ outcomes
in light of his views about discrimination, he is led to develop excessively positive views of his
social groups, and excessively negative views of competing groups. Our framework provides a new
perspective on key facts explained by previous theories based on politician-induced hate (Glaeser,
2005) and the representativeness heuristic (Bordalo et al., 2016), but we also explain several other
facts, including connecting prejudiced beliefs to self-serving beliefs about discrimination, and make
a number of further predictions.
We begin in Section 2 by deriving a general formula for what a person with dogmatic incorrect
beliefs about a variable learns about other variables. This formula is invaluable for our subsequent
analysis, and might also be useful for studying other learning settings with misspecification and
multi-dimensional states and signals. The agent is interested in estimating the levels of L funda-
mentals, with him having a degenerate prior about one fundamental and a full-support prior over
the other fundamentals. He repeatedly observes some linear combinations of the fundamentals with
multivariate normal errors that are i.i.d. over time, and updates using Bayes’ Rule. We identify his
limiting beliefs about the fundamentals and the covariance matrix of the errors, which depend on
what linear combinations he observes, the true covariance matrix of the errors, and how wrong his
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dogmatic belief is. Interestingly, although the agent misinfers the covariance matrix, his inferences
about the fundamentals are the same as when he knows the true covariance matrix.
In Section 3, we turn to our main topic, a theory of social beliefs. We assume that society is
comprised of K potentially overlapping groups, and a person is either a member, a competitor,
or a neutral outsider of a group. The agent observes many draws of the “recognition” — i.e.,
achievement, social status, or other measure of success — of each individual, including himself. He
understands that recognition depends in part on a person’s “caliber” — i.e., ability, hard work, or
other measure of deservingness — and noise, but he also posits that there might be “discrimination”
— or policies, cheating, conspiracies, etc. — that benefit a group and hurt its competitors. Some
of these possibilities might be realistic, while others might be imagined by the agent; but he does
not a priori assume any particular pattern of discrimination, he attempts to learn the true pattern
from his observations, including from direct, unbiased signals about the degrees of discrimination
themselves. All noise terms in the agent’s observations are independent of each other. Crucially,
to these relatively standard ingredients we add a single non-classical but empirically well-founded
assumption, stubborn overconfidence: the agent has a point belief about his own caliber that is
above the correct one.
In Section 4, we identify properties of the agent’s long-run beliefs, beginning with two central
patterns that are widely documented in the literature. First, the agent holds self-serving views
about discrimination: he overestimates discrimination against any group he is a member of and
underestimates discrimination against any group he is in competition with, and consequently he
considers discrimination against his groups as a greater issue than outsiders do. Intuitively, the
agent’s overconfidence implies that the recognition he obtains is in his view systematically too low,
and believing in discrimination against his groups provides an explanation for why this is the case.
Second, the agent is subject to an “in-group bias,” perhaps the most basic finding in the
literature on stereotypes, discrimination, and prejudice: he tends to hold overly favorable views
about those in the same social circles, and overly unfavorable views about those in competing
circles. Intuitively, since the agent believes that discrimination against his groups and in favor of
competing groups is going on, he attributes more of an in-group member’s recognition, and less of
a competitor’s recognition, to caliber.
Beyond naturally accounting for two important stylized facts, our theory makes many subtler
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predictions. As the intuitions make clear, the degree of the agent’s self-serving view of discrimina-
tion, and the degree of his in-group bias, are directly related to his degree of overconfidence. Hence,
we predict that these biases are increasing in overconfidence, or (equivalently in our model) the
extent to which a person feels that he is not getting what he deserves based on his caliber. To our
knowledge, this relationship has not been directly tested in the literature, although it is consistent,
for instance, with the observation that men are both more overconfident and more prejudiced than
women.
A person’s pattern of biases, however, derives not only from his overconfidence, but also from
the manner in which he thinks about society. As an illustrative extreme case, suppose that dis-
crimination is in reality non-existent in society. If the agent conceives of each individual separately
(K = 0 groups), then he develops unbiased beliefs about everyone. If he conceives of individuals
in terms of group membership (K > 0 groups), in contrast, then he concludes that groups are
being treated differently, and develops in-group biases. This sensitivity of beliefs implies that even
asking racist, sexist, or other discriminatory questions, such as “are Mexicans more likely than
Americans to be criminals?”, can be dangerous: if it induces a person to evaluate observations with
a new group distinction in mind, then it can lead to the wrong conclusions. Relatedly, our model
may contribute to understanding the effects of “nation-building” in nineteenth-century Europe and
twentieth-century post-colonial Africa. One common element of these efforts was the use of educa-
tion to encourage thinking in terms of one nation rather than many ethnicities or tribes (Miguel,
2004, Alesina and Reich, 2015). Our theory says that this can lead different ethnic groups to think
more positively of each other.
While changing the agent’s model of society can be helpful, attempts to debias him through the
provision of better information may backfire or be only partially effective. An obvious approach
would be to target the source of the problem — overconfidence — directly by making recognition a
less noisy measure of caliber. Ironically, because this forces the agent to provide a better explanation
for why his recognition is low, it increases all his biases. Similarly, although better information
about discrimination toward a group lowers the agent’s bias regarding that parameter, it also creates
more of a need to explain his low recognition, increasing many of his other biases. For instance, if
someone manages to convince a white male that there is no discrimination against males in hiring
decisions, then he will come to believe in discrimination against whites to a greater extent.
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Changes in the environment can also lead to other forms of “bias substitution” between groups.
For instance, suppose that citizens confronted with the refugee crisis start asking themselves
whether immigrants are different or being treated differently. For a new issue such as this one,
it is plausible to assume that information about discrimination is poor. Then, citizens come to be-
lieve strongly in discrimination toward the new group, and arrive at a strong in-group bias relative
to that group. At the same time, their views of other groups improve. Intuitively, the presence of
immigrants provides a convenient account for why citizens are not getting what they think they
deserve, so they have less need to be prejudiced against other groups. This provides one potential
mechanism for how focusing on an outside group can help unify a population hitherto riddled with
disagreements and dislikes — a common tactic of politicians.
The fact that beliefs in our model depend on group membership implies that patterns of agree-
ment and disagreement will often also fall along group lines, at least when it comes to the beliefs of
overconfident individuals. Then, mechanisms that have previously been identified in the literature
lead to further, potentially detrimental implications. Namely, a person might conclude that out-
siders are not only of lower caliber, but also unreasonable or poorly informed, and he might seek
out information sources consistent with his group’s views.
In Section 5, we consider variants of our basic model. Most importantly, we ask what happens
when the agent does not think in terms of groups (K = 0), but individuals’ recognitions are not
necessarily independent of each other. Then, the agent develops a positive bias about any person
whose recognition is positively correlated with his, and a negative bias about any person whose
recognition is negatively correlated with his. We can then endogenously define the agent’s in-group
as the former group — those “in the same boat” with him — and the latter group as his out-
group. Furthermore, this case of our model provides a potential microfoundation for why an agent
who does not initially think about the possibility of group-level discrimination nevertheless starts
believing in it. Namely, comparing his conclusions to the very observations on which his conclusions
are based, the agent might observe that his in-group does not get the outcomes that he thinks it
should, and draw the natural inference that something must be hurting the entire group.
We also analyze simple versions of our model in which a person observes not just the recognitions
of others, but also signals about their calibers, for instance through personal contact. We show
that more precise information about caliber, or knowing a greater number of individuals, lowers
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all of the person’s biases. More precise information about an outside group’s recognition, however,
lowers the agent’s opinion of the group. This insight provides a justification for the convention
of news outlets not to report the race of a suspected criminal unless it is essential for the story.
Finally, we give an example illustrating that when people are characterized by multiple attributes
(e.g., ability and morality), then the agent may develop positive biases about some but not all of
a competing group’s attributes.
We discuss related literature throughout, but especially in Section 6. While a large literature in
sociology and social psychology explores prejudices and stereotypes, to our knowledge no previous
theory has derived these phenomena from overconfidence or connected them to views about group-
level discrimination. As a result, existing theories make some very different predictions than do we.
Similarly, Glaeser’s (2005) theory that politicians supply, and citizens often passively accept, hate-
creating stories about minorities, and Bordalo et al.’s (2016) theory that individuals exaggerate
distinctive true differences across groups, address different aspects of stereotypes and prejudice
than our paper.
In Section 7, we mention some questions that are unaddressed by our current framework. For
instance, a person might be unsure about the composition of groups in society. Then, we conjecture
that in some circumstances he comes to believe in a secret group that is favored or conspires against
others. More broadly, while our framework takes group relationships as exogenous, it would be
important to endogenize them in future work.
2 Theoretical Tools
In this section, we derive a theoretical result that we will apply in multiple ways to analyze our main
models, and that might be useful for other researchers in studying implications of overconfidence
and other misspecifications. Readers uninterested in our abstract result can skip to Section 3.
A person makes inferences about an L-dimensional vector of fundamentals
f = (f1, . . . , fL)
T ∈ RL ,
which are fixed over time. In each period t, he observes a D-dimensional signal
rt =Mf + ǫt ,
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where M ∈ RD×L is a matrix and ǫt ∈ R
D is a vector of errors that is jointly normally distributed
with mean zero and positive definite covariance matrix Σ. We assume that D ≥ L and M has
rank L. Otherwise, there would be two different fundamentals that entail the same distribution of
signals and hence the agent could not learn the fundamentals even with access to infinite data.
The agent observes a sequence of realizations of r1, r2, r3, . . ., with the ǫt drawn independently
over time. He updates his beliefs in a Bayesian way: given a prior belief P0 over the set of
fundamentals and positive definite covariance matrices, the probability the agent’s posterior belief
Pt assigns to the set A after seeing the the sequence of signals r = (r1, r2, . . . , rt) is given by
PtA =
∫
1(f ′,Σ′)∈Aℓt(r|f
′,Σ′)dP0(f
′,Σ′)∫
ℓt(r|f ′,Σ′)dP0(f ′,Σ′)
,
where the likelihood equals
ℓt(r|f
′,Σ′) =
t∏
z=1
1√
(2π)L detΣ′
exp
(
−
1
2
(rz −Mf
′)TΣ′ (rz −Mf
′)
)
.
Crucially, we assume that the agent is misspecified in a particular sense: while the true value
of fundamental i equals fi, he believes with certainty that it is f˜i.
We consider three different inference problems depending on what aspect of the agent’s be-
liefs are fixed by his prior belief, and what are derived from his observations. In our preferred
specification, the agent is trying to infer the fundamentals f as well as the covariance matrix Σ:
suppP0 =
{
(f ′,Σ′) ∈ RL ×RD×D : f ′i = f˜i,Σ
′ is positive definite
}
. (Case III)
Because they are potentially of interest in other applications, we also consider two simpler infer-
ence problems. We ask what the agent infers about the fundamentals when his beliefs about the
covariance matrix are fixed at some positive definite Σ˜, so that
suppP0 =
{
(f ′,Σ′) ∈ RL ×RD×D : f ′i = f˜i,Σ
′ = Σ˜
}
. (Case I)
And we ask what the agent infers about the covariance matrix when his beliefs about all funda-
mentals are fixed at f˜ = (f˜1, . . . , f˜L)
T , so that
suppP0 =
{
(f ′,Σ′) ∈ RL × RD×D : f ′ = f˜ ,Σ′ is positive definite
}
. (Case II)
We say that the agents’ beliefs concentrate on a point (f˜ , Σ˜) if for every open set A such that
(f˜ , Σ˜) is contained in A, the agent will in the limit assign probability 1 to A:
lim
t→∞
PtA = 1 .
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For stating our theorem, note that any positive definite covariance matrix Σ˜ is invertible, so the
matrixMT Σ˜−1M is well-defined; and sinceM has rank L, this matrix is positive definite and hence
invertible.
Theorem 1 (Long-Run Beliefs). In Cases (I), (II), and (III), the agent’s beliefs concentrate on a
single point (f˜ , Σ˜). Furthermore:
Case (I) If the agent has fixed beliefs Σ˜ about the covariance matrix but is uncertain about the
fundamentals j 6= i, then in the limit his bias about fundamental j is
f˜j − fj =
(MT Σ˜−1M)−1ij
(MT Σ˜−1M)−1ii
(f˜i − fi). (1)
Case (II) If the agent has fixed beliefs f˜ about the fundamentals but is uncertain about the co-
variance matrix, then in the limit his bias about the covariance matrix is
Σ˜− Σ = (M(f˜ − f))(M(f˜ − f))T . (2)
Case (III) If the agent is uncertain about both the fundamentals j 6= i and the covariance matrix,
then in the limit his bias about fundamental j is
f˜j − fj =
[
MTΣ−1M
]−1
ji
[MTΣ−1M ]
−1
ii
(f˜i − fi), (3)
and his bias about the covariance matrix is given by Expression (2).
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows. First, by the seminal result of Berk (1966), beliefs
concentrate on the set of minimizers of the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Intuitively, the negative
of the Kullback-Leibler divergence is increasing in the subjective likelihood of observing the true
distribution of data, so it is a natural measure of how likely a combination of parameters is in
the agent view in the long run. Due to our assumption of normal signals, the Kullback-Leibler
divergence D
(
F,Σ
∣∣∣∣ fˆ , Σˆ) assigned to the parameters (fˆ , Σˆ) when the true parameters equal (f,Σ)
simplifies to
D
(
f,Σ
∣∣∣∣ fˆ , Σˆ) = 1
2
(
tr(Σˆ−1Σ) + (M(fˆ − f))T Σˆ−1M(fˆ − f)− n+ log
det Σˆ
detΣ
)
.
The proof then derives the unique minimizer of the above expression over the support specified
in Cases (I), (II), and (III) using properties of the trace, Kronecker product, determinant, and
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eigenvalues of a matrix. While Case (I) can be verified by taking first-order conditions with respect
to the fundamentals, in Cases (II) and (III) the objective function involves the determinant of Σˆ,
which is not a tractable function in general. We solve this problem by looking at the eigenvalues
of a well-chosen matrix in each case, greatly reducing the dimensionality of the problems as well as
eliminating the determinant from the objective.
One curious fact about the agent’s inferences is immediate from plugging the true covariance
matrix into Expression (1) — which yields exactly Expression (3). Hence, Part (III) says that
when the agent is initially agnostic about both the fundamentals and the covariance matrix, then
— although by Part (II) he misinfers the covariance matrix — his beliefs about the fundamentals
are the same as if he correctly understood the covariance matrix.
3 A Model of Inferences about Individuals and Groups
We now turn to our main interest, a model of how overconfidence affects social beliefs.
3.1 Setup
There are I individuals in society. Individual j ∈ {1, . . . , I} has fixed “caliber” aj ∈ R and K
observable group relationships cj ∈ {1, 0,−1}
K , with cjk = 1 denoting that he is a member of
group k, cjk = 0 denoting that he is outside of but neutrally related to group k, and cjk = −1
denoting that he is in competition with group k. We consider society from the perspective of one
individual i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, whom we call agent i; in some cases, we also compare the views of different
agents who all think according to our model. Agent i observes a sequence of realizations of
qj = aj +
K∑
k=1
cjk θk + ǫ
q
j , j = 1, . . . , I, and ηk = θk + ǫ
η
k , k = 1, . . . ,K, (4)
where qj is individual j’s “recognition” on that occasion, the time-invariant constant θk ∈ R is
discrimination in favor of group k, ηk is a signal of θk, and ǫ
q
j and ǫ
η
k are independent normally
distributed errors with mean zero and variances vqj and v
η
k , respectively. Hence, recognition depends
in part on caliber (and noise), but in addition to that, discrimination toward a group increases a
member’s recognition by a fixed amount and decreases a competitor’s recognition by the same
amount.
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The crucial assumption of our model — and the single non-classical assumption from which our
results derive — is that agent i is overconfident about himself. Formally, while his true caliber is Ai,
he believes with certainty that it is a˜i > Ai. Beyond having an unrealistic self-view, however, agent
i is rational: he applies Bayes’ Rule correctly to update his beliefs. Furthermore, he is agnostic
regarding the levels of discrimination and the calibers of other individuals, with his prior having full
support. Similarly, he is uncertain about the covariance matrix of the errors, with a full-support
prior over positive definite covariance matrices.
3.2 Discussion
Especially given our context of social judgments and prejudice, we think of the variables aj , qj,
and θk, as well as the concept of overconfidence, quite broadly. To start with the first two, a
straightforward interpretation is that aj is ability and qj is wage or other measure of economic
success that is susceptible to discrimination. Alternatively, aj could denote a person’s deservingness
of social rewards based on past work or behavior or general character, with qj capturing the respect
he gets in the form of transfers, perks, or other recognition. For instance, views on whether a
low-income person should get transfers often rest on whether the person is seen as hard-working
and honest, and attitudes toward immigrants are sometimes framed in terms of who deserves
help from the state — with any perceived deviation from fair treatment interpreted as reflecting
discrimination. Accordingly, we think of overconfidence as an overly positive view not only of one’s
ability, but also of one’s skills, importance, appropriate status, or deservingness in society. What
is crucial for our theory is that the overconfident person thinks of the recognition he obtains as
unjustifiably low. And while θk is most straightforwardly interpreted as discrimination, it could
also capture policies that favor a group while potentially hurting others, or any actions by group
members that favor their own group. For instance, group members may cheat at the expense of
outsiders, or they may be part of a conspiracy to benefit themselves.
Since we assume that recognition in reality as well as recognition as perceived by agent i satisfies
Equation (4), our framework implicitly presumes that agent i’s theory includes all groups for which
discrimination occurs (i.e., θk 6= 0). Our theory does, however, allow for the possibility that some
groups in the agent’s theory actually face no discrimination (θk = 0). But even when the agent
includes such an “irrelevant” group in his model of society, he does not assume that there is
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discrimination in favor of (or against) that group, he merely allows for the possibility that there
might be, and evaluates what he sees with this possibility in mind. In fact, the agent correctly
understands that excluding any group for which θk 6= 0 leads to misspecification and therefore
incorrect conclusions; and he wrongly believes that if θk = 0, then he will learn that this is the
case. So from his perspective, it is best to include all potentially relevant groups.
For the purposes of our model, whether a person outside group k is neutral toward or in
competition with group k — i.e., whether cjk = 0 or cjk = −1 — is based on whether discrimination
or other actions that help group k hurt the individual. Technically, we take these relationships as
exogenous, although some economic principles might help guide their specification if the agent is
reasonable. For example, if a socio-economic group is very small, then the agent may reasonably
entertain the idea that there is discrimination in favor of that group, but he cannot reasonably
think that such discrimination would hurt him much. It is important to note, however, that the
agent may perceive potential competition with groups that are logically not well-founded.
We present the model and results by referring to individual j as a person. In reality, it is
unrealistic to assume that a person observes the recognitions of all individuals. An equivalent
model obtains if some observations qj are average recognitions of groups or subgroups. And if
agent i observes an individual’s or group’s recognition with noise, that noise can be incorporated
into the error ǫqj .
The main assumption of our model, that the agent is stubbornly overconfident about himself,
is consistent with a large body of evidence from psychology as well as economics that documents
overly positive self-views among individuals who have had plenty of opportunity to learn about
themselves (see our earlier paper, Heidhues et al., 2018, for a selective review).1 But beyond this
assumption, our model still presumes a lot of rationality in that the agent perfectly applies Bayes’
Rule to a diverse set of observations, and develops a single full set of beliefs about all individuals
and groups. Indeed, if the agent does not update properly about his caliber, one may wonder
whether he makes reasonable inferences about anything. While we cannot think of plausible and
tractable specific alternatives, our modeling assumption of Bayesian updating does not seem to
1 Following Heidhues et al. (2018), we specify agent i’s belief about his own caliber as degenerate for two main
reasons. First, it allows us to study the implications of overconfidence for inferences in a tractable manner. Second,
and more importantly, it is a reduced-form way to incorporate forces modeled in other papers that induce individuals to
retain excessively positive self-views. That there are such forces is supported by the plethora of evidence mentioned in
our earlier paper. Furthermore, a recent experiment by Goette and Kozakiewicz (2018) specifically tests and confirms
the predictions of our earlier model based on point beliefs.
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drive our intuitive results. The pattern of beliefs the agent develops requires only that he seeks
some consistency with his overconfident beliefs, not that he seeks the best possible fit from a
Bayesian perspective. And a person need not hold a single set of beliefs about everything. He may,
for instance, go through a thought process akin to our updating model every time he is induced
to evaluate groups of individuals and discrimination, recalling facts and putting together a story
consistent with his overconfidence in a way that depends on the groups he thinks are relevant at
the moment.
Finally, we analyze only the beliefs of individuals, and do not consider the implications of
these beliefs for behavior. But a large body of evidence on statistical discrimination reviewed by
Bertrand and Duflo (2017) finds that people act on their beliefs in many social situations, and this
has important consequences for economic outcomes. Although most of the literature does not ask
whether individuals’ beliefs are correct, recent work by Arnold et al. (2018) on racial bias in bail
decisions and by Bohren et al. (2018) on gender bias in performance evaluations shows that the
relevant beliefs are biased. This is especially problematic as both theory (Coate and Loury, 1993)
and evidence (Glover et al., 2017, Lavy and Sand, 2018, Carlana, 2019) suggests that stereotypes
can become self-fulfilling through the endogenous responses of interacting individuals. We return
to this issue briefly in the conclusion.
4 Patterns in Beliefs
Theorem 1 implies that agent i’s beliefs converge to point beliefs (in a sense defined precisely in
Section 2). To state our results, we denote agent i’s long-run belief about discrimination toward
group k by θ˜ik, and his long-run belief about individual j’s caliber by a˜
i
j . We also denote true
discrimination in favor of group k by Θk, and individual j’s true caliber by Aj .
Proposition 1 (Biases). Agent i’s long-run bias about discrimination toward group k is
θ˜ik −Θk =
−cikv
η
k
vqi +
∑
k′ c
2
ik′v
η
k′
· (a˜i −Ai), (5)
and his long-run bias about agent j’s caliber is
a˜ij −Aj =
∑
k cikcjkv
η
k
vqi +
∑
k c
2
ikv
η
k
· (a˜i −Ai). (6)
Proposition 1 has a number of important implications for how individuals think about society.
11
4.1 Self-Centered Views of Discrimination
The first implication is immediately apparent from Equation (5): a person overestimates discrimi-
nation against any group he is a member of, and underestimates discrimination against any group
he is in competition with. Intuitively, overconfidence implies that agent i’s average recognition is
not on par with his perceived caliber. A compelling explanation is that discrimination against the
groups he is in and discrimination in favor of the groups he competes with are hurting him.
The above bias is difficult to measure directly if the true extent of discrimination is unclear or not
easily compared to individuals’ opinions. But there is an immediate implication that is amenable
to measurement and consistent with evidence: that a member’s estimate of discrimination against
a group is higher than a non-member’s. Regarding racial discrimination, 88 percent of blacks say
that “the country needs to continue making changes to give blacks equal rights with whites,” while
only 54 percent of whites and 69 percent of Hispanics agree with that statement (Pew Research
Center, 2017, Chapter 4).2 In fact, the majority of American whites think that they are the ones
being discriminated against (National Public Radio et al., 2017). Regarding gender discrimination,
77 percent of surveyed male STEM employees say that women are treated fairly in opportunities
for promotion and advancement, but only 43 percent of females agree (Funk and Parker, 2018).3
And in the financial domain, 37% of those with family incomes over $75,000, but 56% of those with
family incomes below $30,000, think that being rich has more to do with having had advantages
than with working harder (Pew Research Center, 2018a).
It is worth noting that one group the agent conceives of could be a singleton consisting of
himself. In this case, he develops the view that there is some “exclusive” discrimination directed
only at him. If he is in addition particularly bad at judging the degree of exclusive discrimination
(the Σηk corresponding to himself is much higher than the Σ
η
k corresponding to other groups), then
he converges on what might be called paranoid beliefs: he explains his lack of performance mostly
by exclusive discrimination — the belief that “the world is out to get him” and only him. In
this case, the group-based biases we identify below are small. But it seems reasonable to posit
2 More specifically, 70 percent of blacks, but only 37 percent of whites, say that blacks are treated less fairly by
police than whites, with similar gaps regarding the treatment of blacks in courts, stores, public schools, health care,
and on the job (Anderson, 2014).
3 Similarly, in a representative survey of Germans between 39 and 50 years of age, 69 percent of women versus
43 percent of men answered that much still needs to be done to accomplish gender-equality (“Weniger Respekt und
wachsende Fremdenfeindlichkeit”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.09.2019).
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that the typical person is not so bad at judging the degree of exclusive discrimination (i.e., the Σηk
corresponding to himself is not that high). In those cases, all of our conclusions continue to hold.
4.2 In-Group Bias
The agent’s biased beliefs about discrimination in turn lead to biased beliefs about individuals.
Equation (6) implies that the greater is
∑
k cikcjkv
η
k , the more positively biased is a˜
i
j : the more
group memberships and the more competing groups individuals i and j have in common, the higher
is agent i’s opinion of individual j. Intuitively, since agent i believes that discrimination against his
groups and in favor of competitors is going on, the more groups and competitor groups he shares
with individual j, the more he believes individual j is suffering from discrimination, so the more of
individual j’s recognition he attributes to caliber.
The above bias has two important, closely related implications. For simplicity and clarity,
we state these implications in a special case in which a person’s in-group and out-groups are
unambiguous. We say that the group structure is partitional if the K groups are disjoint, their
union is the set of all individuals, and cj = cj′ whenever j and j
′ are in the same group. This means
that society is divided into separate groups, with group memberships determining individuals’
relationships to other groups.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the group structure is partitional, and take two overconfident agents i1
and i2 who belong to different groups k1 and k2.
1. If the average calibers of the groups are equal, then agent i1 believes that group k1 has higher
average caliber than group k2.
2. Agent i1’s belief about the average caliber of group k1, and his belief about the difference
in average calibers between groups k1 and k2, are higher than agent i2’s beliefs about the same
measures.
Part 1 says that if the average abilities of the groups are (approximately) equal, then all groups
believe themselves to be better than other groups. This “in-group bias” is perhaps the most basic
stylized fact in the literature on stereotypes, discrimination, and prejudice. It was central in the
groundbreaking works of Sumner (1906), Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1982), and has been confirmed
by many researchers (see Mullen et al., 1992, for a meta-analysis of 137 studies). As recently as the
90’s, for instance, about 65% of whites expressed the view that whites are more hard-working than
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blacks, and 55% thought that whites are more intelligent (Krysan and Moberg, 2016), while both
whites and blacks showed biological prejudice, the most traditional form of prejudiced belief that
one’s group is innately superior (Hraba et al., 1996).4 Relatedly, Gilens (1999) provides evidence
that the widespread dislike of welfare programs in the US is based on the (mis-)perception of whites
that recipients are mainly blacks lacking sufficient work ethics, which Alesina et al. (2001) argue is
an important reason for why the US welfare state is smaller than its European counterparts.5 And
prejudices can persist even when there is a strong non-discrimination norm: Shayo and Zussman
(2011) document that both Jewish and Arab judges favor plaintiffs of their own ethnicity in Israeli
small-claims courts, although it is unclear to what extent this reflects beliefs rather than tastes.
Research on the in-group bias distinguishes between in-group favoritism and out-group deroga-
tion (Hewstone et al., 2002), with the former being viewed as a more essential and more common
ingredient of in-group bias than the latter. We can define in-group favoritism as the overestima-
tion of in-group members, and out-group derogation as the underestimation of out-group members.
Then, our framework says that an overconfident individual always engages in in-group favoritism,
but he may or may not engage in out-group derogation. First, if agent i is not a competitor of
anyone (for any k, cik 6= −1, and for any j, cjki 6= −1 for i’s group k
i), then he correctly perceives
outsiders. In this case, overestimating discrimination in favor of an outside group does not help
agent i in explaining his low performance, so he misestimates only discrimination vis a vis his
own group. Since his own group has no competitors, however, this does not affect his view of an
outsider. Second, agent i’s evaluation of an outsider j is increasing with each competing group
they share (i.e., for which cik = cjk = −1), so it can be positively biased. Intuitively, if i and j
have a common competitor group, then i believes that j suffers from discrimination in favor of that
group just like he does, which introduces a positive bias in his evaluation. Agent i does derogate
j if he is, or perceives he is, in competition with j (cjki = −1 for i’s group k
i), and they do not
have common competing groups — i.e., they are unequivocal competitors. This pattern is roughly
consistent with the basic premise of group conflict theory discussed below, although we account for
4 In the United States, overt expressions of racism have declined over the years; e.g., in a 2014 survey, “only” 23%
of whites said that blacks are less intelligent (Krysan and Moberg, 2016). But evidence suggests that this decline
reflects individuals’ realization that unambiguous racism is socially unacceptable, and more subtle measures still show
substantial prejudice (see for instance McConahay et al. 1981 for an early constribution, and Fiske and North 2015
for a review of modern prejudice measures).
5 Nevertheless, van Oorschot (2006) finds a similar pattern regarding immigration in Europe: citizens view immi-
grant groups as less deserving than other needy groups, which he points out is in line with prior research suggesting
people close to us in terms of identity are seen as more deserving.
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the same pattern in a different way.
A specific kind of in-group bias discussed in the literature and predicted by our model is a
“legitimizing myth” that rationalizes and thereby helps maintain an arbitrary social hierarchy (see
social dominance theory, e.g., Pratto et al., 2006). Suppose that all groups have the same average
caliber, but there is a dominant social group that benefits from positive discrimination (θk > 0),
resulting in inequality of outcomes. Then, Corollary 1 implies that overconfident members of the
privileged group underestimate or completely fail to appreciate the benefits that they are receiving,
coming to see inequality as a consequence of real differences between groups.
An important pattern not fully consistent with our model, however, is that the in-group bias
is often stronger for the dominant group than the dominated group, and in extreme cases the
dominated group may show a bias toward the dominant group (see Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, pages
228-234). Card et al. (2019) provide a recent example in the academic domain, documenting that
both male and female referees appear to be biased toward male authors. Our theory can account
for an asymmetric in-group bias by means of additional assumptions, for instance if overconfidence
is greater in the dominant group than in the dominated group, but it is inconsistent with a reversed
in-group bias. Hence, reasons outside our framework probably contribute to the asymmetry as well.
For example, if some members of the dominant group control public discourse, they may present
their own interpretations as facts and thereby shift the opinions of all groups.
Part 2 of Corollary 1 states variants of the in-group bias when groups’ calibers are not necessarily
equal, or — as in the above-mentioned case of a group controlling public discourse — other forces
also act on individuals’ views. Even then, an individual evaluates his own group, and his own
group relative to other groups, more positively than outsiders do. Evidence is consistent with this
implication as well. Regarding ethnic groups, attitudes toward Muslim Americans are significantly
more negative among non-Muslims than among Muslims.6 Regarding gender, while both male
and female students give lower evaluations to female instructors than to male instructors, male
6 Specifically, 56 percent of U.S. Muslims, but only 33 percent of the general public, think that Muslims who come
to the U.S. want to adopt American customs, and 20 percent of Muslims, but 51 percent of the general public think
that Muslims want to be different from the larger American society. Regarding another dimension of the issue, 40
percent of the general public think that there is a great deal or fair amount of support for extremism in the Muslim
American community, but only 21 percent of Muslims agree. In reality, Muslim Americans have some distinctly
American values and concerns. For instance, 71 percent — as compared to 62 percent in the general public — say
that most people can get ahead if they are willing to work hard. And Muslims are almost as equally concerned
about Islamic extremism as others, with 60 percent very or somewhat concerned about extremism in the U.S., and 72
percent very or somewhat concerned about extremism in the world, versus 67 and 73 percent for the general public.
For more details, see the report by the Pew Research Center (2011).
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students do so to a greater extent (Mengel et al., 2018). And in an international comparison, 88%
of Americans believe that it would be better for the world if the U.S. was the world leader than if
China was, but in all other countries surveyed, a lower percentage (from 13% in Russia to 81% in
Japan) share that view (Pew Research Center, 2018b).
Although agent i is biased about in-group members, his bias is limited by his overconfidence:
even if he belongs to the exact same groups as individual j (cik = cjk for all k), he has less biased
beliefs about agent j than about himself (a˜ij − Aj < a˜i − Ai). People are positively biased about
those in the same groups, but the median person still believes that he is better than most members
of his closest group.
4.3 Biases Derive from the Perception of Getting Less Than Deserved
Another immediate implication of Proposition 1 is that person i’s biases about both individuals and
discrimination are increasing in his overconfidence a˜i − Ai. As we have mentioned, in our model
overconfidence has an equivalent interpretation to the belief that one is getting less than what
he deserves. Hence, our model predicts that those who feel more strongly that they are getting
less than they deserve are more prone to exhibit the biases and prejudices we identify. We have
not found direct evidence addressing this prediction but it is consistent with some correlational
patterns.7
Relatedly, a simple implication of our framework is that a person’s biases depend on him trying
to explain what is happening to himself. Suppose that in building his theory about society, agent
i acted like a disinterested scientist, fitting a model in which he does not treat his own outcomes
as observations. Then, he uses a correctly specified model, so he develops correct beliefs about
everything. As a specific example, a white male professor studying discrimination in different cities
may conclude that racial and gender discrimination are widespread. At the same time, he may be
prone to believe that discrimination in his own workplace — academia — is non-existent or even
that getting hired or promoted is easier for women and minorities.
7 While the evidence is not fully conclusive, existing research suggests that males tend to be more overconfident
at least regarding “stereotypical male” attributes such as mathematical ability (Beyer, 1990, Jakobsson et al., 2013,
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In as much as males are more overconfident, we predict they have greater belief
biases, and some evidence from Sweden and the US suggests that male students indeed have stronger racial prejudices
(Ekehammar and Sidanius, 1982, Qualls et al., 1992). Researchers have also studied the relationship between self-
esteem and in-group bias, and in line with our prediction have generally found a positive relationship (see, e.g.,
Aberson et al., 2000, for a review). But we cannot be sure that self-esteem is a good measure of overconfidence, even
if it is plausible that they are positively correlated.
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4.4 Biases Derive from Group-Based Thinking
A person’s pattern of biases, however, derives not only from his overconfidence, but also from the
manner in which he thinks about society. As a starting point, suppose that Θk = 0 for all k.
Then, the biases agent i comes to develop are directly related to the extent to which he evaluates
observations with group distinctions in mind. If he conceives of each individual separately instead
of in terms of group membership (K = 0), then he develops unbiased beliefs about everyone. If he
conceives of society in terms of groups (K > 0), in contrast, he concludes that groups he belongs
to or competes with are being treated differently, and develops in-group biases.
This prediction may contribute to understanding the effects of nation-building efforts that were
common in nineteenth-century Europe and twentieth-century post-colonial Africa (Miguel, 2004,
Alesina and Reich, 2015). One common element of nation-building policies was the use of education
to encourage thinking in terms of one nation rather than many ethnicities or tribes. Our theory
says that this can lead different ethnic groups toward perceiving each other as equals, which —
consistent with evidence by Miguel (2004) — presumably improves interethnic cooperation.
To generalize the above insight, we ask what happens when a person adds an irrelevant new
group to his conception of society. In any situation (any K and any Θ1, . . . ,ΘK), this increases his
bias regarding the extent of discrimination:8
Corollary 2. Adding an irrelevant new group (group K + 1 with ΘK+1 = 0) to the agent’s theory
increases
∑
k |θ˜
i
k −Θk|.
If there are more in reality irrelevant groups agent i considers, then he can better explain his
observations by developing biased views about these groups, and hence his total bias regarding
discrimination increases. As a result, agent i’s biases regarding individuals closest to him (for
whom cjk = cik 6= 0 for all k) and individuals furthest from him (for whom cik = −cik 6= 0 for all
k) also increase.
At the same time, some of agent i’s biases can offset each other, so his bias about a person
who shares some but not all group memberships with him can decrease in the number of groups he
considers. As a simple example, suppose first that agent i thinks of one group (K = 1), and ci1 = 1,
cj1 = −1. Then, agent i’s bias about agent j is a˜
i
j − Aj = −v
η
1(a˜i − Ai)/(v
q
i + v
η
1). Now suppose
8 Corollary 2 is somewhat analogous to Schwartzstein’s (2014) result that an agent who ignores an important
explanatory variable when trying to understand his observations may overestimate the relevance of another variable.
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that agent i also considers another division of society (K = 2), with ci2 = cj2 = 1 and v
η
1 = v
η
2 .
Now agent i’s bias is a˜ij −Aj = 0. Intuitively, a white male evaluates a black male more negatively
if he thinks of society along a black/white divide than if he thinks of society along black/white as
well as male/female divides.
In some circumstances, however, adding a new group to a person’s theory does change his views
in a specific direction. In particular, we consider a situation in which agent i starts to contemplate
a group of outsiders who are competitors of one of his groups. For instance, men may start asking
themselves whether a specific group of women is receiving favorable discrimination at the expense
of men.
Corollary 3. Suppose ciκ = 1, and an irrelevant group K + 1 satisfying cjK+1 = −1 for any j
with cjκ = 1 is added to agent i’s theory. This improves agent i’s view of any member of group κ
and worsens his view of any member of group K + 1.
Contemplating the new competitor group, agent i concludes that there is discrimination in favor of
it, which lowers his opinion of the new group and improves his opinion of anyone who he believes
is hurt by the discrimination.
Corollary 3 provides one justification for the view — typically associated with political correct-
ness — that some questions relating to disadvantaged groups should not be discussed or investi-
gated. The concern behind this view is that groups are innately not different, and many racist,
sexist, or other discriminatory questions, such as “are women as capable as men, or are they getting
ahead due to favorable treatment?” can instead promote prejudiced beliefs. From the perspective
of a correctly specified model, such a position is puzzling: if the groups a person investigates are
approximately equal, then he will (eventually) conclude that this is the case, lowering any existing
prejudices. But in our model, asking such questions is indeed prone to produce prejudiced answers
despite equality between groups. Unfortunately, as we have discussed, a person often prefers to ask
such questions, and it might be difficult to prevent him.
4.5 Information about Oneself Increases Biases
We identify a few senses in which attempts to address the agent’s biases through the provision
of information can backfire or be only partially effective. From a classical perspective, the most
obvious way to debias a person if his biases derive from an inflated self-view is to provide more
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accurate information about himself. Indeed, if a person has a correctly specified model with an
overly high prior about himself, better information can serve to rectify his self-view faster. But a
stubbornly overconfident person’s inferences work completely differently: more precise evaluations
of himself (i.e., a decrease in vqi ) merely lead agent i to develop stronger biases about everything.
Intuitively, being evaluated more clearly forces agent i to acknowledge that his low performance is
not due to bad luck, requiring a better explanation for why he is not recognized as he thinks he
should be. He responds by increasing his belief about how much discrimination he suffers from,
resulting in greater in-group biases as well. This implies that societies or parts of society where
evaluations are more frequent or more objectively clear should (all else equal) be more prejudiced.
4.6 Bias Substitution
Attempts to debias can also lead to reallocating a person’s biases. As a case in point, suppose
that information about discrimination toward one group the agent belongs to or competes with
becomes more precise. This could happen due to a social planner providing more information
about discrimination, or due to the agent investigating the issue himself. The effect is not fully
beneficial:
Corollary 4. An increase in the precision of information about discrimination toward a group
that agent i either belongs to or competes with (a decrease in vηk for a k with cik 6= 0) lowers agent
i’s bias regarding discrimination toward group k and his total bias regarding discrimination, but
increases his bias regarding discrimination toward all other groups.
If agent i receives more information about discrimination toward group k, then it becomes more
difficult to maintain that discrimination toward group k is going on, and it becomes more difficult
to believe in discrimination more generally, so his biases regarding these matters decrease. Looking
to explain his recognition in another way, however, agent i engages in bias substitution: he comes
to form more biased beliefs about discrimination toward other groups. For instance, if someone
convinces a white male that there is no discrimination against males in hiring decisions, then he
comes to believe in discrimination against whites to a greater extent.
Another manifestation of bias substitution occurs when the agent finds a new competitor group
to evaluate his observations with, such as when citizens are confronted with the refugee crisis and
start asking themselves whether immigrants are different or are being treated differently. For a new
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issue such as this one, it is plausible to assume that information about discrimination is poor, so
that Σηk is large.
Corollary 5. Suppose that a new competitor group of individuals is added to society (individuals
j = I + 1, . . . , I ′ with cjK+1 = 1 for j > I, cjK+1 = −1 for j ≤ I, and cjk = 0 for any j > I and
k ≤ K). Then, agent i develops a negative bias about any member of group K + 1, and if vηK+1 is
sufficiently large, then he develops a positive bias about everyone else.
Intuitively, the presence of immigrants provides a convenient account for why agent i is not getting
what he thinks he deserves, so he comes to believe in discrimination in favor of immigrants and
develops a negative view of immigrants. But because he views his fellow citizens as also competing
with immigrants, he forms positive opinions of them. This provides a mechanism for how focusing
on a competitor outside group can help unify a population hitherto riddled with disagreements and
dislikes — a common tactic of politicians. At the same time, agents who do not view themselves as
competitors of the new group — perhaps because they are wealthier and do not compete directly for
low-income housing and other state benefits — do not come to believe in favorable discrimination
towards the new group, do not form negative opinions of it, and do not change their opinions of
others.
4.7 Tendency to Agree with In-Group and Disagree with Out-Group
The fact that beliefs depend on group membership implies that patterns of agreement and disagree-
ment often also fall along group lines, at least when it comes to the beliefs of overconfident individ-
uals. Suppose that agents i1 and i2 have the same degree of overconfidence: a˜i1 −Ai1 = a˜i2 −Ai2 .
Then, Equation (5) implies that agents i1 and i2 agree about the direction of discrimination toward
a group if and only if they have the same relationship with the group (ci1k = ci2k). And Equation
(6) implies that agents i1 and i2 agree about the calibers of all individuals if they share all group
memberships (ci1 = ci2), and otherwise they may disagree about some or all individuals. Because
different biases can cancel each other, however, the degree of agreement is not necessarily decreasing
in the number of shared groups.9
9 As an example, suppose that K = 2, ci11 = ci12 = 1, cj1 = 1, cj2 = −1, and Σ
η
1 = Σ
η
2 . Then, agents i1 and i2
agree about the caliber of individual j if ci21 = ci22 = −1, but they do not agree if ci21 = 1, ci22 = −1. For instance,
a white male and an African American female may evaluate a white female similarly, as they are both biased against
her for different reasons. But a white male and a white female do not evaluate the white female similarly.
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Once individuals develop group-based disagreements, mechanisms that have previously been
identified in the literature can lead to further, potentially detrimental implications. Analogously
to Gentzkow and Shapiro’s (2006) theory of media bias — where a consumer rates sources that
agree more with his priors to be of higher quality — the agent finds stories and news reports
consistent with discrimination against his in-groups, and with his out-groups being less able, as
most credible, and may differentially seek out such sources. Furthermore, an individual’s recognition
that those outside his circles have different opinions can lead him to conclude that these outsiders
are unreasonable or poorly informed, reinforcing the in-group bias we have found above. Worse, just
as in Prendergast’s (1993) theory of “yes-men,” employees in organizations may — in an attempt
to appear unbiased — respond by expressing opinions consistent with those in decisionmaking
positions. While it applies only to settings where women’s actions are observed by men, this insight
can help explain the observation that women sometimes display as much gender discrimination as
men.10
By the logic of our model, the pattern of disagreements above applies only to overconfident indi-
viduals. Individuals who have realistic beliefs about themselves also develop realistic beliefs about
others and about discrimination. Hence, realistic individuals agree with each other irrespective of
group membership, and disagree with overconfident individuals of all groups.
5 Model Variants
5.1 Correlated Errors and Endogenous Groups
In our main model above, group relationships are exogenous. In the current section, we consider a
model in which there are no exogenously given groups that the agent considers relevant to think
about, but nevertheless he develops biases. This variant allows us to endogenize a person’s in-group
and out-group in some situations, and motivates why the agent might want to think of groups and
group-level discrimination even in other situations.
Formally, we make two modifications to our previous model, with all other assumptions re-
10 See, e.g., Bagues et al. (2014) in the context of academic evaluations, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) in
the context of judicial hiring decisions, and Card et al. (2019) in the context of refereeing at top journals. At the
same time, other authors, including Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) studying academic promotions, Gagliarducci and
Paserman (2012) studying municipal governments, De Paola and Scoppa (2015) studying academic evaluations, and
Kunze and Miller (2017) studying promotions at private firms, find that women are treated better by other women
than by men.
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maining unchanged. First, there are no groups, so recognition qj = aj + ǫj is an unbiased signal
of caliber. Second, the ǫj are not necessarily independent, but have a positive definite covariance
matrix Σq.
A plausible economic example is team production. The I individuals are working in two disjoint
teams. Pay is determined by individual performances, which depends in part on individual ability
and idiosyncratic noise. But pay also depends on shocks common to the team, such as how well-
chosen the tasks are or how a manager evaluates team performance in allocating bonuses. This
noise structure induces positive correlation between the outcomes of individuals on the same team,
and may induce negative correlation between the outcomes of individuals on different teams.
Biases are now determined in the following way:
Proposition 2 (Correlated Errors and Biases). Agent i’s long-run bias about agent j is
a˜ij −Aj =
Σqij
Σqii
(a˜i −Ai), (7)
while his bias about the covariance matrix is given by
Σ˜qjj′ −Σ
q
jj′ = (a˜
i
j −Aj)(a˜
i
j′ −Aj′) =
Σqj′iΣ
q
ji
Σqii
2 (a˜i −Ai)
2 . (8)
To start developing intuition for Proposition 2, suppose first that agent i has a correct un-
derstanding of the covariance structure of signals. As before, the basic implication of agent i’s
overconfidence is that he repeatedly observes levels of qi that seem to him surprisingly low. If he
knows that qi and qj are positively correlated, then his conclusion that qi is systematically too low
leads him to conclude that qj must be systematically too low as well. As a result, he overestimates
individual j.
By the second part of Proposition 2, however, the agent misestimates the covariance matrix as
well; specifically, he overestimates the covariance between qj and qj′ if and only if he misestimates
individuals j and j′ in the same direction. For an intuition, suppose that he overestimates both
individuals. Then, in a prototypical observation both qj and qj′ seem to him to be unexpectedly
low and thus positively correlated.
Finally, Proposition 2 implies that agent i’s misestimation of the covariance matrix does not
affect his inferences about individuals. Intuitively, the amount by which agent i overestimates
aj relative to ai (i.e., (a˜
i
j − Aj)/(a˜i − Ai)) both determines the relative amount by which he
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overestimates the covariance of qj and qi ((Σ˜
q
ij −Σ
q
ij)/(Σ˜
q
ii−Σ
q
ii)), and is determined by his relative
estimate of that covariance (Σ˜qij/Σ˜
q
ii). This can only be consistent if he estimates the relative
covariance (Σ˜qij/Σ˜
q
ii) correctly.
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While agent i’s long-run conclusions depend on the correlation structure of the signals, a realistic
person’s long-run conclusions do not. For an overconfident agent to make correct inferences, indi-
viduals must not only be evaluated in an unbiased way, they must be evaluated in an independent
way from him.
This model allows us to endogenize a person’s in-group as individuals whose outcomes are
positively correlated with his — those “in the same boat” with him — and his out-group as
individuals whose outcomes are negatively correlated with his. With this endogenous specification
of the in-group and out-group, the model predicts the same type of in-group bias that we have
identified in Section 4, as well as an interesting pattern of biases in agent i’s perception of the
covariance structure. Specifically, agent i overestimates the covariance between the outcomes of two
in-group members as well as the covariance between the outcomes of two out-group members, but
he underestimates the covariance between the outcomes of an in-group member and an out-group
member. These biases are consistent with one aspect of perceived group homogeneity defined by
Linville et al. (1989) and documented by Quattrone and Jones (1980), that a person overestimates
how much one group member’s outcome predicts another’s outcome. Perceived group homogeneity
is an interesting contrast to correlation neglect, whereby people perceive or assume less correlation
between relevant variables than there is in reality (Demarzo et al., 2003, Eyster and Rabin, 2005,
Enke and Zimmermann, forthcoming).
Furthermore, the current model suggests one possible explanation for why individuals might
want to estimate theories of discrimination, as we have assumed exogenously in Sections 3 and 4.
Comparing his conclusions to the very performances that generated his conclusions, agent i might
notice that his in-group is faring persistently worse, and his out-group is faring persistently better,
than he thinks they should given their calibers. Even if he initially did not think so, he might begin
to suspect that discrimination is going on. As a result, he might be drawn to evaluate the data
allowing for discrimination.
11 Formally, Part II of Theorem 1 implies that (Σ˜
q
ij
−Σ
q
ij
)/(Σ˜q
ii
−Σ
q
ii
) = (a˜ij−Aj)/(a˜i−Ai); and Part I of Theorem 1 implies
that (a˜
i
j−Aj)/(a˜i−Ai) = Σ˜
q
ij/Σ˜qii. For both equations to hold simultaneously, it must be that (Σ˜
q
ij
−Σ
q
ij
)/(Σ˜q
ii
−Σ
q
ii
) = Σ˜
q
ij/Σ˜qii.
Dividing by the right hand side and rewriting yields (1−Σ
q
ij
/Σ˜
q
ij
)/(1−Σq
ii
/Σ˜
q
ii
) = 1, implying that Σ˜
q
ij/Σ˜qii = Σ
q
ij/Σqii.
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A natural question is what happens when — combining our model in Section 3 with that here
— agent i allows for group-level discrimination, and individuals’ recognitions are correlated. In
fact, our proof of Proposition 1 allows for this possibility, and implies that the effects are additive:
agent i’s opinion of individual j is increasing both in the covariance between their recognitions and
in the number of groups and competing groups they share.
5.2 Personal Contact
In this section, we consider how an agent’s inferences are modified if he also observes signals of
the calibers of individuals. This could happen, for instance, if he has personal contact with or a
trustworthy source about some members of society, so that he receives signals about them that are
not tainted by discrimination.
We assume that agent i makes the same observations as in the model of Section 3, and also
observes signals of individuals’ calibers. Because the general analysis appears intractable, however,
we solve a special case of the model. We assume that there is only one group, and each individual is
either a member or a competitor of the group (cj ∈ {−1, 1}); we drop the subscript 1 for the single
group. Furthermore, recognitions qj = aj + cjθ+ ǫ
q
j , signals about caliber sj = aj + ǫ
a
j , and signals
about discrimination η = θ + ǫη are independently distributed with ǫqj ∼ N(0, v
q), ǫaj ∼ N(0, v
a),
and ǫη ∼ N(0, vη). This means that individuals’ recognitions have the same variance, and so do
signals about individuals’ calibers.
Proposition 3 (The Effect of Personal Contact). Agent i’s long-run bias about discrimination is
θ˜i −Θ =
−vη(vq + va)ci
(vq + vη)(vq + va) + (I − 1)vqvη
· (a˜i −Ai),
and his long-run bias about individual j is
a˜ij −Aj =
vηvacicj
(vq + vη)(vq + va) + (I − 1)vqvη
· (a˜i −Ai).
The qualitative pattern of biases is similar to that before: the agent is prone to believe in
discrimination against his group and in favor of the out-group, and he develops positive biases
regarding his in-group and negative biases regarding his out-group. But Proposition 3 also implies
that more accurate information about individuals’ calibers (a lower va) and observing more people
(a higher I) both lower all biases. Intuitively, the former makes it more difficult to maintain one’s
24
biases about individuals, and the latter provides better information about the role of discrimination
in performances by allowing a person to compare those performances to his direct observations
about caliber. For instance, getting to know many members of an out-group might make it clear
that their achievements are not due to favorable discrimination.
In the comparative static above, a reduction in va applies to observations of both in-group
members and out-group members. Although the intuition applies generally, unfortunately we can-
not solve a model in which the variances are different. To help confirm the effect of improved
information about just out-group members, we consider a particular example.
Example 1. Suppose that I = 4, with individuals 1 and 2 being members and individuals 3 and 4
being competitors of the group. Agent 1 observes an out-group member’s recognition with variance
vqo, and an out-group member’s caliber with variance vao . The variances of all other errors are 1.
Then,
a˜13 −A3
a˜1 −A1
=
a˜14 −A4
a˜1 −A1
=
−2vao
5vqo + 5vao + 4
and
θ˜11 −Θ1
a˜1 −A1
=
−2(vqo + vao)
5vqo + 5vao + 4
. (9)
Confirming the previous logic, better information about the out-group’s caliber (a reduction in vao )
lowers all of the agent’s biases. This makes the agent more realistic not only about his out-group
and the extent of discrimination, but also about his in-group. Intuitively, receiving more accurate
information about the out-group’s caliber makes it more difficult to believe that the group’s average
caliber is low, which in turn makes it more difficult to believe that discrimination in favor of the
out-group is going on. As a result, it is also less viable to believe that the in-group has high caliber.
The prediction of our model that contact between different groups can reduce prejudices and
biases is an instance of Allport’s (1954) influential contact hypothesis, for which the evidence is
overwhelming. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) provide a meta-analysis of hundreds of studies, most
of which find evidence consistent with the hypothesis. Many studies are correlational in nature,
which are suggestive albeit not well-identified.12 But evidence reviewed by Paluck et al. (2018) in
which researchers experimentally manipulate interactions between groups shows that contact has
a causal negative impact on prejudices.
12 As a simple illustrative example from a poll by the Pew Research Center (2006), 52 percent of Americans
agreed with the statement that immigrants are a burden because they take jobs and housing. It is unlikely that the
same percentage of immigrants agree, so this is probably another instance of in-group bias. But more important for
the present purpose is the geographic variation in these beliefs. In areas with a high concentration of foreign-born
individuals, only 47 percent of those with U.S.-born parents think that immigrants are a burden, whereas in areas
with a low concentration of foreigners, 65 percent think so. Of course, an alternative interpretation is that immigrants
settle in places that are friendlier toward them.
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Proposition 3 also implies that observing more accurate information about individuals’ recogni-
tions rather than caliber is detrimental. Part of the reason is the same as in our basic model: better
information about himself makes it more imperative for the agent to explain why his recognition
is low, increasing all his biases. But Example 1 makes it clear that there is another effect acting
through observations of the out-group. Observing more accurate information about the recognition
of the out-group (i.e., a decrease in vqo) decreases the agent’s misinference about discrimination, but
it increases his bias about the out-group’s caliber. The intuition is the following. Given that agent
1 overestimates discrimination in favor of the out-group, the actual recognition of the out-group
is worse than he expects. He attributes this difference to noise, but a decrease in the noise makes
such an attribution less plausible. As a result, he concludes that discrimination must not be as
strong, but also that the out-group must be of lower caliber, than he thought. For example, many
majority Eastern Europeans believe that the Roma receive positive discrimination from police and
get away with crimes too easily. Our model says that providing more information about how badly
the Roma are treated will lead the majority to conclude not only that favorable treatment is not as
pronounced, but also that the Roma are committing worse crimes, than they previously thought.
This prediction of our model provides a potential justification for the practice of mainstream
news outlets not to report the race of a suspected criminal unless it is essential for the story.13
Under the assumption that all parties use a correctly specified model, it is difficult to understand this
practice, especially when in reality groups’ crime rates do not differ much. But in our model, giving
more precise information about outsiders’ outcomes — as would be the case if racial information
was provided — creates or exacerbates incorrect, prejudiced views, so it can be seen as harmful. It is
important to emphasize, however, that other misspecifications on the part of readers or journalists
can also render racial information in crime reporting detrimental.14
5.3 Multi-Dimensional Attributes
In our models above, each individual is characterized by a single attribute ai. In reality, people
think of others in multidimensional ways. In this section, we consider a simple example of such
13 See for example Guideline 12.1 of the German Press Codex (available at https://www.presserat.de/fileadmin/
user_upload/Downloads_Dateien/Pressekodex13english_web.pdf).
14 For instance, some journalists may hold prejudiced views that affect when and how they report a criminal’s
race. If readers do not account for journalists’ prejudices when interpreting reports, they can develop biased views.
And within our framework, reporting racial information can also encourage readers to think in terms of races and
the moral standing of different races. If so, our model says that this can increase racial biases (Section 4.4).
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richer conceptualizations of individuals; a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of the paper.
Example 2. There is one group and two individuals, with individual 1 being a representative member
and individual 2 being a representative competitor of the group. Agent 1 makes observations about
the social statuses of his in-group and out-group, which equal
q1 = a1 +m1 + θ1 + ǫ
q
1 and
q2 = a2 +m2 − θ1 + ǫ
q
2,
where aj is group j’s talent, mj is group j’s morality, and θ1 is discrimination in favor of the
in-group. Agent 1 also observes his out-group’s business success, which equals
b2 = 2a2 +m2 + ǫ
b
2.
Hence, business success is unaffected by discrimination, and depends relatively more on talent
than does social status. Finally, the agent observes a signal of discrimination η1 = θ1 + ǫ
η
1 as
before. We assume that the agent is overconfident regarding his total deservingness of social status,
overestimating a1 +m1 by ∆1. The errors are independent, with the variance of ǫ
q
1 being v
q
1 and
the variance of ǫη1 being v
η
1 . Then, agent 1 develops the following biases in the long run:
a˜12 −A2 =
1
1 + vq1/v
η
1
·∆1; m˜1 −M1 =
−2
1 + vq1/v
η
1
·∆1; θ˜1 −Θ1 =
−1
1 + vq1/v
η
1
·∆1.
As in our previous models, the agent comes to believe that discrimination against his in-group
and in favor of the out-group is going on. But he does not develop exclusively negative views of
the out-group as a result: he comes to think that the out-group in more talented than it really
is. Intuitively, given that he believes discrimination in favor of the out-group is going on, he
underestimates the out-group’s total deservingness of status, a2 + m2. At the same time, he
must reconcile his beliefs with realistic views of the out-group’s business success, which are more
sensitive to a2. The best way to do so is to slightly overestimate the out-group’s talent and grossly
underestimate its morality.
Of course, the above overestimation depends on the specific pattern of observations the agent
makes, and is therefore a possibility result rather than a general prediction of our model. Nev-
ertheless, it is consistent with the observation that stereotypes about out-groups are sometimes
positive. For instance, Jews used to be stereotyped as smart and hard-working, women are often
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seen as being kind and empathic, and some minority men are considered good athletes. At first
sight, this may seem to contradict the idea that individuals tend to hold negative or at best realistic
views of their out-groups. Yet exactly as in our example, even when some stereotypes are positive,
they often go along with, or even form part of, broader and arguably more important negative
stereotypes (see Jackson 2011, pp. 18-20, for a discussion, and Glick and Fiske 1996 and Fiske et
al. 2002 for closely related ideas). That Jews are smart and hard-working goes along with the idea
that they are cool and competitive. That women are kind goes along with the view that they are
not capable leaders. And that minorities are good athletes goes along with the notion that they
are not good at academics.
6 Related Literature
In this section, we relate our theory to research not discussed elsewhere in the paper.
Because the agent draws conclusions from observations while holding an incorrect view about
himself, conceptually our paper belongs to the growing literature on learning with misspecified
models. Researchers have studied inferences by individuals who ignore some explanatory variables
(Hanna et al., 2014, Schwartzstein, 2014), misunderstand causal relationships (Spiegler, 2016),
misinterpret social observations (Bohren, 2016, Bohren and Hauser, 2019), are overconfident (Hes-
termann and Le Yaouanq, 2016, Heidhues et al., 2018), or make mistakes in applying Bayes’ Rule
(e.g., Rabin and Schrag, 1999, Rabin, 2002). The specific economic questions we ask and the specific
theoretical methods we use are different from those in the literature.
The predominant economic approach to stereotypes — i.e., generalizations about groups — is
that of statistical discrimination, in which individuals use available information correctly to make
inferences about individuals (Phelps, 1972, Arrow, 1973). In our setting, the agent also uses his
observations to form beliefs, but he does so incorrectly. In this sense, our model can be thought of
as one of misspecified statistical discrimination.
From a psychological perspective, our model is most closely related to social identity theory
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979, Tajfel, 1982). Social identity theory posits that individuals see themselves
as members of relevant social groups — their in-groups — and identify with those groups. As a
result, their self-esteem is bound up with their in-groups, so thinking positively about their in-groups
and negatively about their out-groups leads them to think and feel positively about themselves.
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Our theory also implies that a person’s prejudices are intimately tied to his views about himself,
but the connection follows a different — in a sense reverse — logic: a person thinks positively about
himself, and this leads to biases about his in-groups and out-groups. By virtue of being the most
consistent beliefs with an inflated self-view, the prejudices in our model can also be interpreted as
helping to maintain a high self-esteem.
Relatedly, group conflict theory posits that competition between two groups for the same limited
resource naturally leads to hostility between the groups, as well as discrimination and prejudice
(Jackson, 2011). We derive prejudiced beliefs from intrapersonal considerations.15
Another strand of the social psychology literature conceptualizes stereotypes as heuristic sim-
plifications of real attributes of groups. Bordalo et al. (2016) formalize this idea using a version of
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) representativeness heuristic. They assume that a person considers
a trait more typical in a group if it is relatively more common in the group than in the relevant
comparison group. This approach does not comfortably explain why stereotypes are often deroga-
tory prejudices and why many views are self-serving, and unless different groups have different
comparison groups, it also does not explain why different groups hold different views. On the other
hand, our framework does not explain neutral stereotypes, such as the view that Swedes are blonde,
which the framework of Bordalo et al. does.
Glaeser (2005) presents a political-economy model of hate, which he defines as beliefs about
the harmfulness of others. Politicians can send fake messages that the out-group is dangerous, and
these messages are costly for the electorate to investigate. Because voters who believe that the
out-group is dangerous prefer policies that lower the out-group’s resources, politicians benefit from
hate-inducing messages that complement their policies. For instance, a pro-redistribution politician
might want to induce hate against rich minorities. Unlike our framework, this model explains how
the political environment can affect people’s beliefs about minorities, and which messages are
communicated by which politicians. At the same time, our theory helps understand why negative
attitudes often persist without politicians stoking them, or even despite politicians’ attempts to
debias. In addition, our theory can be viewed as one explanation for Glaeser’s (2005) assumption
that only hateful messages can be sent: negative messages about other groups resonate more with
citizens because these fit better with pre-existing beliefs.
15 See also Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for a theory about the effects of identity on behavior, which are less related
to our theory focused on beliefs.
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7 Conclusion
Our theory posits exogenously given groups that are known to individuals. What happens when
— as in reality — groups are endogenous and not fully known is an interesting question for future
research. As a simple illustration, consider a young academic who is unsure about what determines
publication success but knows that he is not a member of a privileged group that accepts each
other’s papers at the expense of others. As he observes that his papers do not get the credit he
overconfidently believes they deserve, he concludes that there must be such a group. As a result,
he tries to find the group and become a member of it (rather than improving papers). Since he
never finds the group, he develops the conspiracy theory that it must be a secret society.
While we study only beliefs in this paper, ultimately we are interested in how actions interact
with biased beliefs. Among the many possible questions, consider the troubling finding in the
literature on stereotypes we have mentioned: that biased beliefs can become self-fulfilling through
a variety of mechanisms. Our model provides a platform for exploring such mechanisms. For
instance, researchers have found that a salient negative stereotype (a “stereotype threat”) can
directly affect a stereotyped person’s performance in the relevant domain (Steele and Aronson,
1995). This changes the observations people make about the person for the worse, exacerbating the
stereotype and potentially creating a vicious circle that ends in a real performance gap far greater
than the bias itself.
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A Proofs
For brevity, throughout the Appendix we denote the bias of the agent’s long-run beliefs about
fundamental j by
∆j = f˜j − fj,
and let ∆ = (∆1, . . . ,∆L)
T .
Proof of Theorem 1. As shown in (Berk, 1966, main theorem p.54) the support of the agent’s
beliefs will concentrate on the set of points that minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence to the
true model parameters (f,Σ) over the support of P0
argmin
(fˆ ,Σˆ)∈suppP0
D
(
f,Σ
∣∣∣∣ fˆ , Σˆ), (10)
where the Kullback-Leibler divergence is given by
D
(
f,Σ
∣∣∣∣ fˆ , Σˆ) = E
[
log
ℓ1(r1|f,Σ)
ℓ1(r1|fˆ , Σˆ)
]
.
We will argue that the minimization problem (10) admits a unique solution when the prior P0
satisfies either (Case I), (Case II), or (Case III) and thus beliefs concentrate on a single point. As
both the true model as well as the subjective model are Normal, we have that the Kullback-Leibler
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divergence simplifies to16
D
(
f,Σ
∣∣∣∣ fˆ , Σˆ) = 1
2
(
tr(Σˆ−1Σ) + (M(fˆ − f))T Σˆ−1M(fˆ − f)−D + log
det Σˆ
det Σ
)
. (11)
Throughout, we denote by f˜ , Σ˜ the agents subjective long-run beliefs about the mean of the fun-
damentals and the covariance matrix. Define the matrix
B =MT Σ˜−1M ∈ RL×L
and denote it’s elements by (Bjk)j,k∈{1,...,L}. For future reference, note that since Σ˜ is symmetric,
so is MT Σ˜−1M , and thus Bjk = Bkj. Furthermore, as Σ˜ is positive definite, so is Σ˜
−1 and
B =MT Σ˜−1M .
We first analyze Case (I): By condition (Case I) the minimum in (10) is taken over means of the
fundamentals fˆ or equivalently biases ∆ = fˆ −f , taking the subjective covariance matrix Σˆ = Σ˜ as
given. By Berk’s Theorem, the agent’s beliefs about the fundamentals concentrate on the set that
minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence (11). As we can ignore all terms that do not depend on
fˆ , we get that the support of the subjective long-run belief about the mean of the fundamental is
contained in
argmin
fˆ : fˆi=f˜i
(M(fˆ − f))T Σ˜−1M(fˆ − f) = f + argmin
∆: ∆i=f˜i−fi
∆T
(
MT Σ˜−1M
)
∆
= f + argmin
∆: ∆i=f˜i−fi
L∑
k=1
L∑
j=1
Bkj∆k∆j . (12)
Here the sum symbolizes the addition of f to every element by element in the set of minimizers.
Taking the first order conditions in the bias about fundamental ∆h for h 6= i and using that
Bjk = Bkj yields
0 = 2
L∑
k=1
Bkj∆k .
Dividing by 2 and plugging in ∆k =
B−1ki
B−1ii
∆i on the right-hand-side yields
L∑
k=1
Bkj∆k =
L∑
k=1
Bkj
B−1ki
B−1ii
∆i =
∆i
B−1ii
L∑
k=1
BkjB
−1
ki =
∆i
B−1ii
L∑
k=1
BjkB
−1
ki =
∆i
B−1ii
(BB−1)ji ,
16 See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kullback\%E2\%80\%93Leibler_divergence#
Multivariate_normal_distributions
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which equals zero as BB−1 is the identity and i 6= j. Hence, ∆k =
B−1ki
B−1ii
∆i satisfies the first order
condition.
Let ek be the k-th unit vector, for k ∈ {1, . . . , L}. We next verify that the first order condition
is sufficient for a global minimum. To do so, we rewrite the part of the objective (12) in terms of
∆−i =
∑
j 6=i ej∆j
∆TB∆ =

ei∆i +∑
j 6=i
ej∆j


T
B

ei∆i +∑
j 6=i
ej∆j

 = (ei∆i +∆−i)T B (ei∆i +∆−i)
= (ei∆i)
T B (ei∆i) + ∆
T
−iB∆−i + 2 (ei∆i)
T B∆−i . (13)
The Hessian with respect to ∆−i of (13) equals 2B. As any quadratic form with a positive definite
matrix Hessian has a unique global minimum that satisfies the first-order condition, it follows that
indeed
∆k =
B−1ki
B−1ii
∆i =
(MT Σ˜−1M)−1ij
(MT Σ˜−1M)−1ii
∆i
is the unique global minimizer for all k 6= i. This completes (I).
We next analyze Case (II): In this case the agent takes the subjective mean of the fundamentals
f˜ and thus the bias ∆ as given and estimates the covariance matrix Σ˜. Again, by Berk’s Theorem
the agent’s beliefs about the covariance matrix concentrate on the set that minimizes the Kullback-
Leibler divergence (11), which is equivalent to the set
argmin
Σˆ
(
tr(Σˆ−1Σ) + (M∆)T Σˆ−1(M∆) + log
det Σˆ
detΣ
)
. (14)
Denote by · ⊗ · : RD × RD → RD×D the Kronecker product. In matrix notation, we want to show
that the unique minimum of (14) is attained at
Σˆ = Σ + (M∆)⊗ (M∆)T
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To simplify notation let y =M∆. We first manipulate the objective function
tr(Σˆ−1Σ) + yT Σˆ−1y + log
det Σˆ
detΣ
= tr(Σˆ−1Σ) + tr(yT Σˆ−1y) + log(det Σˆ)− log(det Σ)
= tr(Σˆ−1Σ) + tr(Σˆ−1[y ⊗ yT ])− log(det Σˆ−1)− log(det Σ)
= tr
(
Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
− log
(
det Σˆ−1
)
− log(det Σ)
= tr
(
Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
− log det
(
Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
+ log det
(
Σ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
= tr
(
Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
− log det
(
Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
+ log det
(
Id+Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ]
)
. (15)
Here we used in the first equality that a real number equals it’s trace and the log of the ratio equals
the difference of the logs. The second equality uses that the trace of ATB equals the trace of BAT .
For third equality we use that the trace is an additive function. In the last equalities we use that
the sum of logarithms equals the logarithm of the product and that the product of determinants
equals the determinant of the product. Now notice that since Σ and y do not depend on Σˆ, the set
of minimizers equals
argmin
Σˆ
tr(Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])) − log(det(Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])). (16)
Let λ1, . . . , λD be the eigenvalues of the matrix Σˆ
−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ]). Since the trace is the sum of
eigenvalues and the determinant is the product of eigenvalues, (16) is minimized by all matrices Σˆ
such that the eigenvalues of Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ]) minimize
D∑
k=1
λk −
D∑
k=1
log λk. (17)
As (17) is strictly convex, we can take the first order condition to identify the unique minimizer.
This yields that (17) uniquely minimized if and only if λk = 1 for all k. As all eigenvalues equal one
and Σ˜−1(Σ+ [y⊗ yT ]) is symmetric—and hence diagonalizable—, Σ˜−1(Σ+ [y⊗ yT ]) is the identity
matrix. This establishes that
Σ˜ = Σ + [y ⊗ yT ] = Σ + (M∆)⊗ (M∆)T (18)
is the unique minimizer of (14) and thus the subjective long-run belief of the agent about the
covariance matrix. This establishes (II).
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Finally, we prove Case (III): Again, by Berk’s Theorem the agent’s long-run bias about the
fundamental and beliefs about the covariance matrix concentrate on the set that minimizes the
Kullback-Leibler divergence (11)
argmin
(∆,Σˆ) : ∆i=f˜i−fi
1
2
(
tr(Σˆ−1Σ) + yT Σˆ−1y −D + log
det Σˆ
detΣ
)
. (19)
As shown in (15) this objective is equivalent to 1/2 times
tr
(
Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
− log det
(
Σˆ−1(Σ + [y ⊗ yT ])
)
−D + log det
(
Id+Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ]
)
.
Plugging in the minimizer for the covariance matrix Σ+ [y ⊗ yT ] derived in part two simplifies the
objective to
log det
(
Id+Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ]
)
. (20)
We first observe that as the determinant is the product of eigenvalues, (20) equals the sum of the
logarithms of the eigenvalues of Id+Σ−1[y⊗yT ]. Furthermore, if λ is an eigenvalue of Id+Σ−1[y⊗yT ]
with associated eigenvector v then λ− 1 is an eigenvalue of Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ] as
λv = (Id+Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ])v ⇒ (λ− 1)v = Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ]v .
If we denote the eigenvalues of Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ] by λ1, . . . , λD then the objective (20) equals
K∑
i=1
log(λk + 1) .
As eigenvalues are independent of the basis, we next choose an orthogonal basis x1, . . . , xD such
that x1 = y (we can always do so by picking an arbitrary basis and applying the Gram-Schmidt
process). Denote, 1 = (1) the 1× 1 identity matrix. As xi is orthogonal to y = x1, we have that
Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ]xi = Σ
−1[y ⊗ yT ][1⊗ xi] = Σ
−1[y1]⊗ [yTxi] =


0 if i 6= 1
(yT y)(Σ−1y) if i = 1
.
Hence, D − 1 of the eigenvalues of Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ] equal zero. We will next show that v = Σ−1y is
an eigenvector with associated non-zero eigenvalue. Let v =
∑D
i=1 αixi be the representation of
v = Σ−1y in the basis x. We have that
Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ]v = α1(y
T y)(Σ−1y) = α1(y
T y)v
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and thus v is an eigenvector of Σ−1[y⊗yT ] with eigenvalue α1(y
T y). As α1 is given by the projection
of v on y, we have that α1 =
yT v
yT y
and thus the non-zero eigenvalue of Σ−1[y ⊗ yT ] equals
α1(y
T y) = yT v = yTΣ−1y .
Consequently, the agents long-run belief about the mean of the state satisfies
f˜ = f + argmin
∆: ∆i=f˜i−fi
yTΣ−1y
= f + argmin
∆: ∆i=f˜i−fi
∆T
(
MTΣ−1M
)
∆ .
By (I) we have then have that the unique minimizer and thus the long-run belief of the agent is
given by
∆k =
[
M
T
Σ−1M
]−1
ki[
MTΣ−1M
]−1
ii
∆i for k 6= i
Σ˜ = Σ+ (M∆)⊗ (M∆)T
. (21)
This completes the proof of (III).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Σq,Ση be the variance-covariance matrices of ǫq and ǫη,
Σq = diag(vq1, . . . , v
q
I )
Ση = diag(vη1 , . . . , v
η
K)
and observe that they are invertible as the variances are greater than zero. We show that this
model can be reduced into our old model. To see this observe that one can write the vector (q η)T
in matrix notation as 
q
η

 =

Id C
0 Id

 ·

a
θ

+

ǫq
ǫη

 . (22)
Let
M =

Id C
0 Id

 .
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As M has determinant 1 it is invertible. We have that the matrix
[
M
T
Σ−1M
]−1
is given by
[
M
T
Σ−1M
]−1
=M−1Σ(M−1)T =

Id −C
0 Id



Σq 0
0 Ση



 Id 0
−CT Id


=

Id −C
0 Id



 Σq 0
−ΣηCT Ση

 =

Σq + C Ση CT −CΣη
−ΣηCT Ση

 .
By Theorem 1 agent i’s bias about the ability of agent j is given by
a˜ij −Aj =
[
M
T
Σ−1M
]−1
ij[
MTΣ−1M
]−1
ii
∆i =
[
Σq + C Ση CT
]
ij
[Σq + C Ση CT ]ii
(a˜i −Ai)
=
∑
k cikcjkv
η
k
vqi +
∑
k c
2
ikv
η
k
· (a˜i −Ai) .
By a similar argument we have that the estimated bias associated with characteristic k is given by
θ˜ik −Θk =
[
M
T
Σ−1M
]−1
i(I+k)[
MTΣ−1M
]−1
ii
∆i =
[
−ΣηCT
]
ik
[Σq + C Ση CT ]ii
(a˜i −Ai)
=
−cikv
η
k
vqi +
∑
k
∑
k c
2
ikv
η
k
· (a˜i −Ai).
This proves the result.
Proof of Corollary 1. Part 1. Consider individual i, who is a member of group k. For any
individual j in group k, cikcjk = 1, so by Equation (6) individual i overestimates individual j.
Hence, individual i overestimates the average ability of group k. For any k′ 6= k and member j
of group k′, we have cik′cjk′ ≤ 0, so individual i does not overestimate individual j. As a result,
individual i does not overestimate the average ability of group k′.
Given that the average abilities of the groups are equal and i1 overestimates the average caliber
of k1 but not of k2, the result follows.
Part 2. Since, by the reasoning in the first paragraph of the proof of Part 1, i1 overestimates the
ability of group k1 but i2 does not, i1 believes the average ability of k1 to be greater than i2 does.
And because in addition i2 overestimates the average ability of k2 while i1 does not, i1 thinks that
k1 − k2 is greater than i2 does.
Proof of Corollary 2. Using Equation (5), we have∑
k
|θ˜ik −Θk| =
∑
k |cik|Σ
η
k
Σqi +
∑
k c
2
ikΣ
η
k
· (a˜i −Ai) =
∑
k c
2
ikΣ
η
k
Σqi +
∑
k c
2
ikΣ
η
k
· (a˜i −Ai)
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Adding an irrelevant group increases the numerator and denominator on the right-hand side by the
same amount. Since the numerator is smaller, the fraction increases.
Proof of Corollary 3. Note that c2iK+1 = 1. For any member j 6= i of group κ, ciK+1cjK+1 = 1.
Hence, adding group K + 1 increases the numerator and denominator on the right-hand side of
Equation (6) by the same amount. Since the ratio has absolute value less than 1, this increases the
ratio.
For any member j of group K + 1, ciK+1cjK+1 = −1. Hence, adding group K + 1 lowers the
numerator on the right-hand side of Equation (6), and raises the denominator by the same amount.
Since the ratio has absolute value less than 1, this lowers the ratio.
Proof of Corollary 4. Obvious from Equation (5).
Proof of Corollary 5. The negative bias about members of groupK+1 follows from the facts that
for any j > I, ciK+1cjK+1 = −1 and cjk = 0 for any k ≤ K. The second part follows from the fact
that for any j ≤ I, ciK+1cjK+1 = 1, and that for Σ
η
K+1 sufficiently large, this term dominates.
Proof of Proposition 2. We apply Part III Theorem 1 to f = a,M = Id. Then, [MTΣ−1M ] = Σ,
and M(f˜ − f) = a˜−A, yielding the formulas in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. Again the model is a special case of our general model introduced in
Section 2 with 

q
η
s

 =M

a
θ

+ ǫ ,
where ǫ ∼ N(0,Σ). We have that the matrix M is given
M =


Id C
0 Id
Id 0


and the variance covariance matrix is of the form
Σ =


vqId 0 0
0 vηId 0
0 0 vaId

 .
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By Theorem 1 (III), we have that the agent’s long-run bias is given by
∆k =
[
M
T
Σ−1M
]−1
ki[
MTΣ−1M
]−1
ii
∆i . (23)
To compute the agents beliefs we first compute (MTΣ−1M)−1. We get that
MTΣ−1M =

 Id 0 Id
CT Id 0

×


1
vq
Id 0 0
0 1
vη
Id 0
0 0 1
va
Id

×


Id C
0 Id
Id 0


=

 Id 0 Id
CT Id 0

×


1
vq
Id 1
vq
C
0 1
vη
Id
1
va
Id 0


=

( 1vq + 1va ) Id 1vqC
1
vq
CT 1
vη
Id+ 1
vq
CTC

 .
The inverse to this matrix is given by
[MTΣ−1M ]−1 =

( 1vq + 1va ) 1vη Id+ 1vqvaCCT 0
0
(
1
vq
+ 1
va
)
1
vη
Id+ 1
vqva
CTC


−1
×

 1vη Id+ (CCT ) 1vq −C 1vq
−CT 1
vq
(
1
vq
+ 1
va
)
Id


=

[( 1vq + 1va ) 1vη Id+ 1vqvaCCT ]−1 [ 1vη Id+ (CCT ) 1vq ] − [( 1vq + 1va ) 1vη Id+ 1vqvaCCT ]−1C 1vq
−
[(
1
vq
+ 1
va
)
1
vη
Id+ 1
vqva
CTC
]−1
CT 1
vq
[(
1
vq
+ 1
va
)
1
vη
Id+ 1
vqva
CTC
]−1 ( 1
vq
+ 1
va
)
Id

 .
To identify agent i’s biases regarding other individuals, we need to understand the upper left corner
of this matrix. Furthermore, since each bias given in (23) is given by the ratio of two matrix entries,
it is sufficient to understand the matrix up to a multiplicative constant. The matrix is proportional
to [
vq + va
vη
Id+ CCT
]−1 [vq
vη
Id+ CCT
]
.
Define x = v
q+va
vη
∈ R and y = v
q
vη
∈ R. Rewriting gives
[
xId+ CCT
]−1[
xId+ CCT + (y − x)Id
]
= Id+ (y − x)
[
xId+ CCT
]−1
. (24)
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We consider the special case in which there is one group, and each individual in the population
is either a member or a competitor of the group. This means that C is an N -dimensional vector
consisting only of +1’s and −1’s. Notice that in this case
(CCT )2ij =
∑
k
(CCT )ik(CC
T )kj =
∑
k
cic
2
kcj =
∑
k
cicj = N (CC
T )ij ,
so that (CCT )2 = I CCT . Given this, we have that
[
x Id+ CCT
](1
x
Id−
1
x2 + I x
CCT
)
= Id−
x
x2 + I x
CCT +
1
x
CCT −
1
x2 + I x
CCTCCT
= Id−
x
x2 + I x
CCT +
1
x
CCT −
I
x2 + I x
CCT
= Id ,
and thus [
xId+ CCT
]−1
=
1
x
Id−
1
x2 + I x
CCT .
As a consequence we get that (24) simplifies to
Id+ (y − x)
[
xId+ CCT
]−1
= Id+
y − x
x
Id−
y − x
x2 + I x
CCT =
y
x
Id+
x− y
x2 + I x
CCT .
Plugging in for x and y yields
vq
vq + va
Id+
va
vη(
vq+va
vη
)2
+ I v
q+va
vη
CCT ,
which is proportional to
vqId+
va
vq+va
vη
+ I
CCT .
Hence, agent i’s bias regarding agent j satisfies
a˜ij −Aj
a˜i −Ai
=
(
vqId+ v
a
vq+va
vη
+I
CCT
)
ij(
vqId+ v
a
vq+va
vη
+I
CCT
)
ii
=
va
vq+va
vη
+I
cicj
vq + v
a
vq+va
vη
+I
=
vηvacicj
(vq + vη)(vq + va) + (I − 1)vqvη
.
Similarly, the upper right corner of the matrix is proportional (with the same proportionality) to
−vηC +
vη
vq+va
vη
+ I
CCTC
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Notice that CCTC = I C. Hence, the ith component of the above vector equals
−
vq + va
vq+va
vη
+ I
ci,
and therefore agent i’s bias about discrimination is
θ˜i1 −Θ1
a˜i −Ai
=
− v
q+va
vq+va
vη
+I
ci
vq + v
a
vq+va
vη
+I
=
−vη(vq + va)ci
(vq + vη)(vq + va) + (I − 1)vqvη
.
Calculations behind Example 1. In the notation of Theorem 1,
f =


a1
a2
a3
a4
θ1


, M =


1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 −1
0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0


, Σ =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 σqo 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 σqo 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 σao 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 σao


.
Applying Part III of Theorem 1, and using Matlab in symbolic mode yields the results.
Calculations behind Example 2. Let a′1 = a1 + m1 and a
′
2 = a2 + m2. In the notation of
Theorem 1,
f =


a′1
a′2
θ1
a2


, M =


1 0 1 0
0 1 −1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0


, Σ =


vq1 0 0 0
0 vq2 0 0
0 0 vb2 0
0 0 0 vη1


.
Applying Part III of Theorem 1, and using Matlab in symbolic mode yields the results.
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